I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about what default rule should govern access to websites and proprietary networks connected to the Internet. 1 It argues that the best default is a rule of consent supported by judicial injunctions to facilitate bargaining on terms most likely to enhance net social welfare.
Under this rule, courts should presume that a website owner who connects a website to the Internet consents to any lawful use of the website by any person who can access the website. Owners should be able to rebut this presumption by notifying users that the owner does not consent to particular uses, or consents to use subject only to certain conditions. Notice should be fitted to the use, so that automated browsing programs are bound only by notice they can read, while individual users or programmers are bound only by notice they can read. Conditions should be analyzed under general legal rules, such as contract and antitrust. Deviations from this regime may sometimes be warranted, but this position should be the default.
What are the other options? Instead of a rule of consent, one could argue for a rule of mandatory access. On this view, anyone who makes content available on the Internet joins a network in which anyone may access anything, and the Internet is a commons. 2 The extension of this premise is that no right to exclude should be recognized and all uses should be privileged.
No one actually advocates a pure commons view, and with good reason. Even working solely within a utilitarian model, 3 sometimes welfare is enhanced by excluding persons from websites, as with websites that must limit access to comply with the securities laws, or websites that must password-protect content to charge fees necessary to keep the site running. 4 Some uses reduce welfare, as when persons embed pornographic images in chat rooms, 5 or when a former employee sends an e-mail to his employer describing the sexual practices of a current employee. 6 Because the commons view offers no justification for any form of exclusion, it cannot distinguish among such cases. Therefore, if implemented, the commons view would actually tend to diminish the diversity of social experience on the Internet. The commons view would leave all websites open for any use, meaning no websites could be reserved for particular uses. Declaring that every website is a speaker's corner would diminish the ability of particular websites to be anything other than an expressive free-for-all. Websites with more particular missions, such as classrooms or symphony halls, would have a harder time achieving those missions if they were treated as quads or football stadiums. 7 Variations on the commons theme are possible. Such variations, however, tend to produce ad hoc positions rather than arguments, and these positions do not state premises that can justify weakening the pure commons position while stopping short of a rule of consent.
Why consent? Following basic Coasean reasoning, 8 I argue that the real choice in the access debate is between property rules and liability 3. I assume for purposes of this Article that utilitarianism is the relevant mode of analysis, rather than Lockean theories of property. I do not wish to endorse that view as such, just to limit the scope of the argument here.
4. See infra Part III (arguing that exclusion is essential to a website's social function). rules. Property rules are preferable because bargaining over access is possible and bargaining is a surer guide to the welfare effects of access than alternatives, such as judicial cost-benefit analysis. Though theoretical claims of market failure have been advanced in the access debate, those claims are not borne out by the cases. 9 In addition to the general arguments in favor of bargaining, I argue that judicial secondguessing of access decisions, as would occur under a liability rule, would have undesirable effects. Such second-guessing would impair the discretion website owners need to constitute the expressive environments in which website users and network users, including employees, operate. By limiting website owner discretion, judicial oversight would tend to homogenize environments.
Part II of this Article explains the trespass to chattels doctrine, which several courts have used to implement consent as the principle governing website access. It argues that this doctrine does not deserve the severe academic criticism it has received. Part III discusses how different access rules affect the internal constitution and managerial authority of website owners and firms connected to the Internet. Among other things, it explains why the idea that there is a free speech right to access websites and networks is normatively and doctrinally wrong. Part IV takes up the general normative question of whether access to websites and networks should be governed by a rule of mandatory access or a rule of consent. It provides reasons for favoring consent, and thus a property rule, over other competing rules.
II. POSITIVE LAW AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
This Part discusses the doctrine of trespass to chattels, which courts have used to regulate access to websites, and the academic critiques of that use of the doctrine. 11 It argues that the doctrine has received unjustifiably bad press in scholarly circles. 12 Courts applying the doctrine to enjoin use of specific websites have extended it to protect an interest the law recognizes but expects to be protected by self-help. Injunctions in such cases achieve the results contemplated by existing law; criticizers of injunctions implicitly maintain that the cause of action must remain the same, even if that means the doctrine produces different results than it did in the past.
A. Judicial Adoption of the Trespass to Chattels Tort
To Regulate Access
Section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts ("Restatement") says a defendant may be liable under the doctrine of trespass to chattels either for "dispossessing another of the chattel" or for "using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another." 1 3 As the disjunctive language indicates, "dispossessing" and "intermeddling" are two different things.
Section 221 of the Restatement defines "dispossession" to include taking a chattel from another, obtaining it by fraud, barring the owner's access to the chattel, destroying the chattel, or taking it into the custody of the law. 14 Comment e to section 217 defines "intermeddling" as "intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel." 5 The distinction between dispossession and intermeddling is reinforced in section 218, the Restatement's liability provision. A person is liable for trespass to chattels if she dispossesses another of the chattel, impairs the condition, quality, or value of the chattel, deprives the owner of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or causes bodily harm to the possessor or to "some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest." 16 Dispossession without harm may create a basis for liability. 17 In unusual cases, so may uses that neither dispossess the owner of the chattel nor harm the chattel. 18 The doctrine is legally significant even where it will not provide a basis for damages. The Restatement says trespass to a chattel "may... be important in the determination of the legal relations of the parties" even if the trespass is "not ... actionable because it does no harm to the chattel or to any other legally protected interest of the possessor."' 19 Most importantly, even in cases where no harm is done to a chattel, a trespass "affords the possessor a privilege to use force to defend his interest in its exclusive possession." 20 The Restatement links the possessor's privilege to defend her interest in a chattel to what comment e to section 218 refers to as " [t] he interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability." 2 1 That comment states that an owner's interest in the inviolability of a chattel differs legally from "the similar interest of a possessor of land," because the chattelowner's interest "is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. 2 2 The Restatement takes the position that this differential treatment of "similar" interests is justified because "[s]ufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless interference." The Restatement therefore does not recognize fundamentally different interests between owners of land and owners of chattel. Instead, it refers to both types of owners as having a "similar" interest in inviolable possession. 24 The Restatement does treat them differently with respect to remedies for harmless invasion of that interest; the landowner gets an action for nominal damages, while the chattel owner gets a privilege to use self-help to stop the invasion. 25 The trespass to chattels doctrine became prominent in access cases following Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek. 26 Thrifty-Tel provided longdistance telephone service. 27 The Bezeneks were the parents of two teenage boys who obtained a Thrifty-Tel access code from a friend. 28 The boys used that code to enter the Thrifty-Tel system in an effort to obtain an authorization code that would allow them to make free longdistance calls. 29 They failed, but on their second attempt they employed an automated calling strategy that clogged the system and denied some customers access.
30
Thrifty-Tel sued the boys' parents and won on the theory that the boys had converted the access codes. 3 1 On appeal, the court worried that the tort of conversion might not apply to such intangible property.
32
It resolved the worry by affirming liability on a trespass to chattels theory. 3 3 The court said the tort creates liability "where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately 24. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 77-78 (emphasizing the inviolability of a possessor's interest under the Restatement).
25. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1995. Professor Epstein suggests the law recognizes a cause of action for harmless trespass to land but not chattels because the cause of action is useful to settle title disputes over land. Where two parties disagree on who owns land, it would be silly to require harm in order to bring the case to court. For chattel, the same purpose is served by recognizing a cause of action for dispossession without regard to harm. Epstein, supra note 8, at 78. He also suggests the Restatement recognizes a self-defense privilege rather than a cause of action because " [n] [Vol. 35 caused injury," 34 and it held that this theory avoided the question of whether intangible property may be converted. 35 The trespass to chattels theory found its way to Internet access cases through CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,36 in which the court employed this theory to enjoin Cyber Promotions from sending bulk e-mail, or span, to CompuServe customers over CompuServe's network. CompuServe customers paid for the time they spent on the system, so wading through spam cost them money. 37 Many customers complained to CompuServe about spam, and some cancelled their subscriptions. 38 CompuServe complained to Cyber Promotions and insisted that it stop spamming CompuServe customers, but the complaints did not work. 39 CompuServe tried blocking Cyber Promotions' spain, but that did not work either, n° so CompuServe sued.
The CompuServe court accepted the Thrifty-Tel holding that electronic signals can support a trespass claim. 4 1 It extended that analysis by emphasizing the language of Restatement section 218(b), which says liability exists where a trespass impairs the "condition, quality, or value" of a chattel. 4 2 The court thought spamming lowered the value of CompuServe's systems because spam "demand[s] the disk space and drain[s] the processing power of plaintiffs computer equipment." 43 That might have been a good argument in Thrifty-Tel, where some customers were actually blocked out of the system, 4 4 but the evidence in CompuServe showed only that the defendant's spain placed a "tremendous burden" on the system. 4 5 There was no evidence that the system could not bear that burden. There was no evidence that the plaintiff's servers crashed, that it ran out of disk space, or that its 34 . Id. at 473. 35. The court drew an analogy to trespass to land cases holding that trespass could be established by proving that a defendant caused intangible phenomena such as dust, sound waves, smoke, and vibrations to affect a plaintiff's land, even if the plaintiff was not put off the land or prevented from using it. In light of these cases, the court said, "the electronic signals generated by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action." Id. at 473 n.6 (collecting cases countermeasures. The court saw its injunction as remedying the failure of the self-help privilege, which the Restatement expected would be "sufficient" to protect the owner's interest in inviolable possession. 52 46. Even the decision of the California Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, which tends to emphasize the burden of spai in previous cases in order to distinguish them from its rejection of the trespass to chattels tort in this context, claims only that, in CompuServe, the defendant's spam created "some interference with the efficient functioning of [CompuServe's] computer system." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 304 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis added). The court made no effort to explain what it meant by efficient, nor why inefficiency should count as harm under its reasoning. As discussed below, this type of reasoning creates perverse incentives for firms: the more costs they sink to develop capacity, the fewer rights they have. See infra text accompanying note 162 (arguing that the belief that only crashing is harm allows firms with high costs weaker rights than firms with low costs). 
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CompuServe may be read as taking into account all the economic costs of the defendant's use, regardless of whether those costs were accompanied by physical harm or dispossession, which the Restatement seems to assume would go together. Such comprehensive accounting is what utilitarian analysis demands. On this view, the case did not extend the trespass to chattels cause of action but only applied it to a type of harm not present in earlier cases. One might disagree with this view, of course, and, opting for formalism over utilitarianism, insist that only physical harm should support a theory of recovery under trespass to chattels. Even on that view, however, the court only extended the cause of action to compensate for the failure of self-help. 53 The court did not invent a new legal interest.
CompuServe went some way toward establishing owner consent as the basis for regulating website access. The facts did not present squarely the question of whether a website owner could deny access in the absence of even indirect economic harm. That bridge was crossed in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. 54 eBay is an Internet auction site. 55 Bidder's Edge ran a site that aggregated bids for similar items at different auction sites and posted comparative bid prices. 56 Bidder's Edge did not run auctions itself, but its users could see what an item was going for on various sites and pick the cheapest auction to bid on. 5 7 To run its site, Bidder's Edge needed to obtain information on eBay's auctions. 58 Bidder's Edge asked and received permission to obtain such data from certain auctions. 59 It later asked and received permission to expand the number of auctions it covered. 6° Both parties expected they would agree on terms for a licensing agreement for Bidder's Edge's queries and its use of data pertaining to auctions held on eBay. eBay wanted Bidder's Edge to query the eBay site only when a Bidder's Edge user queried its site. 62 eBay felt this limitation would reduce the load on its system and increase the accuracy of the data Bidder's Edge posted. 6 3 Bidder's Edge wanted to query eBay's system on a recurring basis using programs known as robots. 64 This procedure would allow Bidder's Edge to compile its own auction database, comprised partly of data copied from eBay, which would allow it to respond to queries faster than if it browsed eBay only when a user submitted a query. 65 Recursive robot searches also would allow Bidder's Edge to track auctions generally and update its users when auction activity warranted.
66
When negotiations broke down, the parties began a game of cat and mouse. 67 eBay is about use, not harm. 7 5 The court said eBay had a "fundamental property right to exclude others from its computer system." 76 eBay worried that, unless enjoined, Bidder's Edge might violate this right without penalty because its queries probably would never amount to a conversion of eBay's system. 77 The court enjoined Bidder's Edge on the ground that eBay was likely to prove that Bidder's Edge's queries "have diminished the quality or value of eBay's computer systems" because these queries deprived eBay of the use of a portion of its capacity and "[t]he law recognizes no such right to use another's personal property."
78
Though the court's speculation about harm detracts significantly from the normative force of the opinion, Judge Whyte was right to enjoin Bidder's Edge. Because the Restatement does recognize an interest in the inviolable possession of chattel, the court was right to say the law gave Bidder's Edge no right to query eBay's servers. Judge Whyte therefore could have rested his opinion on the same ground as the CompuServe court: his injunction protected eBay's interest "in the mere inviolability of [its] chattel ' 79 when its self-defense efforts failed.
80
In economic terms, Judge Whyte favored the injunction, a property rule, because it forced the parties to bargain. Property rules left the parties freer to negotiate than they would have been under a nuisance theory of liability which, unlike injunctions, permits a court to 73 
. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 n.9 ("eBay's motion appears to be, in part, a tactical effort to increase the strength of its license negotiating position and not just a genuine effort to prevent irreparable harm.").
second-guess the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of different uses. A contrary decision might have let Bidder's Edge free ride on eBay's investment, subject to a duty to pay damages for physical harm. At a minimum, it would have made litigation risk relevant to bargaining, which would lessen the degree to which bargaining reflected the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of the use at stake.
eBay was part of a trend of cases extending the trespass to chattels tort to deal with unwanted uses of websites and proprietary networks. To date, most courts presented with such cases have accepted the trespass tort. 8 1 Many of these are federal cases, however, in which federal judges interpret state law. 82 State courts remain free to reject this extension of the trespass tort, which the Supreme Court of California did in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.
83
Hamidi was a former Intel employee who obtained a list of Intel email addresses and, over a twenty-one-month period, sent six mass emails to thousands of Intel employees. The e-mails criticized Intel's employment practices generally, warned current employees that they were at risk from the practices, and suggested that current employees look for other jobs. 84 Intel sued to enjoin Hamidi's mass e-mailing on trespass to chattel and nuisance theories. After Intel dropped the nuisance theory, the trial court issued an injunction on the trespass theory. 8 5 The court of appeals affirmed the injunction, which the Supreme Court of California reversed.
The state supreme court held the trespass to chattels tort did not apply in its current form to Intel's claim because Intel alleged harm to its workers' morale and productivity rather than harm to its computers. 8 6 In the court's view, the trespass tort could only be brought to redress "an injury to the company's interest in its computers." 87 The court 81 . In addition to the cases discussed above, see cases cited supra note 11, which also extended the doctrine of trespass to chattels. The court declined to extend current trespass doctrine on the ground that there was a debate about how best to govern access to servers connected to the Internet and the court was not in the best position to resolve that debate. The court noted that some academics, such as Professor Richard Epstein, argued that extending the tort would facilitate bargaining that would produce the socially optimal result. 91 Others, such as Professors Mark Lemley, Dan Hunter, and Lawrence Lessig, predicted that extending the tort would seriously diminish the social value of the Internet. 9 2 In light of this debate, the court thought it would be rash for it to adopt a "rigid" or "absolute" property rule.
93
Hamidi acknowledges that server owners have an interest in the inviolable possession of their equipment, that self-help may be inadequate to defend that interest, and that no one else has a legal right to use the equipment without the owner's consent. However, Hamidi holds that the owner has no cause of action to stop unwanted use unless that use harms the equipment itself, rather than the owner's business. Like the academic critique it partly embraces, the Hamidi opinion is highly formal. I examine the doctrinal aspect of that critique in the next section. I examine the empirical predictions of that critique in Part IV.
B. Academic Criticism of the Doctrine
Many law professors, most prominently Professor Dan Burk, oppose decisions extending the trespass to chattels theory to website and network access cases. They object in particular to the injunctions the 88 theory supports. 94 In an article that has proved prescient in many ways, Professor Burk argues that judicial use of the trespass to chattels theory in access cases has been unprecedented, unjustified, and undesirable. He favors using the nuisance tort to deal with such cases.
5
Writing after Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe, but before eBay and Hamidi, Professor Burk said the former cases "recognize a novel proprietary interest for which the label 'trespass to chattels' is merely a convenient apology." 96 He criticized this interest as "a new form of intellectual property, with only the most tenuous of antecedents in the law of chattels," and noted that cyberspace trespass actions are "particularly ill-suited to a medium that draws its unique benefits from shared resources." 9 7
More particularly, Professor Burk argued that Thrifty-Tel extended the trespass tort "without any serious analysis" 9 8 by "blithely gloss [ing] over" 99 the distinction between trespass to land and trespass to chattels. Similarly, he believes CompuServe "glibly intermingles trespass to chattels with doctrines related to real property."' 1 0 0 Professor Burk believes that, though trespass to chattels and trespass to land "may share a common history, and even a common name," it is a mistake to conflate them because "they secure entirely different interests."
Citing Dean Prosser, Professor Burk describes trespass to chattels as a weaker version of the conversion tort rather than a variation of the tort of trespass to land. 10 2 In Professor Burk's view, the "gravamen of both" conversion and trespass to chattels "lies in the dispossession of the property from its owner. In conversion, the dispossession is total; in trespass to chattels, the dispossession is only partial."' 1 3 Thus, 95. Burk, supra note 2, at 53 ("[N]uisance would authorize computer owners to legally 'defect' from the network when necessary to avoid wasteful negative externalities, but require them to remain legally networked when necessary to generate beneficial positive network externalities.").
96. Id. at 28 (setting the foundation for his argument [Vol. 35
Website Access: The Case for Consent Professor Burk contends, neither tort "entails the interest in inviolability that attends trespass to land." 10 4 For these reasons, Professor Burk charges that the courts in ThriftyTel and CompuServe "essentially reversed several hundred years of legal evolution" by "collapsing the separate doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to chattels," thereby effectively creating "a brand new cause of action, unknown to modem jurisprudence."' 1 0 5 Other scholars, notably Professor Maureen O'Rourke, have offered related criticism.
6
These cases do not deserve such condemnation. The Restatement makes clear that "dispossession" and "intermeddling" are alternative theories of recovery, 10 7 and that liability even for intermeddling may rest on harm "to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. ' 108 The CompuServe decision rested explicitly on this analysis, rejecting the proposition that "dispossession" is required to sustain the tort. 10 9 Its rejection is consistent with the language of Restatement section 217.
More fundamentally, the premise that current law recognizes no interest in the inviolable possession of chattels is not true. It is true that the Restatement provides an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddling with land but not for harmless intermeddling with chattel. 1 1° It is also true, however, that the Restatement states that chattel owners have an interest in the inviolable possession of chattel, which it believes enjoys "sufficient" protection through the privilege to 104 . Id. 105. Id.; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between trespass to land and trespass to chattels in the Restatement). These arguments are echoed in an amicus brief filed in eBay by twenty-eight law professors, who wrote in part that Judge Whyte's analysis in eBay "relies on a principle of 'inviolability' of property that has never been the rule for personal property and certainly not for information. 107. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (differentiating between disposition and intermeddling, and stressing their independent bases for liability for trespass to chattels).
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; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (stressing that the chattel itself need not be harmed to sustain a trespass to chattels cause of action). [Vol. 35 use reasonable force "'to protect his possession against even harmless interference."'
The problem these cases present is that technology has undermined this expectation. In the cases following Thrifty-Tel, defendants used technical means to defeat the owner's self-help measures; self-help therefore was not "sufficient" to protect the plaintiffs' legal interest. 112 If it had been sufficient-if CompuServe and eBay had succeeded in blocking input from Cyber Promotions or queries from Bidder's Edgethen Cyber Promotions or Bidder's Edge could have gained access to the websites only by obtaining the plaintiffs' consent. The injunctions in CompuServe and eBay forced the defendants to try to obtain the plaintiffs' consent for their uses. Those injunctions therefore actually mimic the results noted in the Restatement when it said self-help would be "sufficient" to protect an owner's interest in the inviolable possession of chattel.
Apart from Hamidi, which is willing to divide an owner's entitlement from a legal remedy for violation of that entitlement, the cases extend the doctrine to compensate for the failure of self-help, but they do not alter the real-world results that would occur if, as the Restatement contemplates, self-help worked. For these reasons, courts should not be condemned for wrongly conflating trespass to chattels and trespass to lands. The only difference relevant here is that the law traditionally protected harmless invasions of chattels by giving owners a privilege to use self-help rather than by giving them a cause of action, which owners of land did have.
Finally, Professors Burk and O'Rourke have suggested that copyright law may preempt the trespass tort, and that it at least balances incentives to create and distribute information that courts should not disturb by extending the trespass tort. 115 The tort is not preempted. Spam cases, in which users attempt to send or "push" data through a network, or place data on a website, 1 16 do not resemble copyright cases. Even in "pull" cases, where a user copies data from a website with an eye toward distributing it or making it available to others, trespass doctrine forbids use without regard to copying or distribution, while the Copyright Act forbids copying and distribution even where use of a particular copy is lawful. 117 Because the Copyright Act has an express preemption provision, 118 I would hesitate to endorse penumbral preemption of the trespass tort. As a general matter, it is fair to counter the move of classifying all sites abstractly as databases, and thus beyond copyright's protection, 1 9 by treating the trespass tort abstractly as well.
More substantively, websites do not function socially as phone books. They play varied and dynamic social roles, the success of which land unfit for raising cattle. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959). Bradley maintained the distinction somewhat arbitrarily by holding that if particles did not accumulate, then a plaintiff could sue only for nuisance; accumulation constituted trespass. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791. The court modified trespass doctrine in such cases, requiring that the plaintiff show harm, but it did so largely because of worries over transaction costs. See id.; infra note 187 (discussing the Bradley court's conversion of the property rule of trespass into a liability rule).
114. See Poff v. Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234, 240 (Ala. 2000) ("Trespass to real property is similar to trespass to chattels in that trespass, generally, 'is a wrong against the right of possession'." (quoting Jeffries v. Bush, 608 So. 2d 361, 362 (Ala. 1992))).
115. Burk, supra note 2, at 35 (arguing that the tort creates a new IP fight of inviolability); O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 590, 592 (raising preemption and policy concerns).
116 may depend on the right to exclude. For example, website owners are likely to have contracts with the people a user would like to reach by sending content through the owner's website, as in CompuServe or Hamidi. It is therefore relatively easy for recipients, website owners, and users to internalize social costs and benefits through contracting. The utilitarian argument for judges or other officials to engage in costbenefit analysis of their own in such "push" cases is therefore relatively weak.
In some cases, users who copy and distribute data, thus "pulling" it from websites, may generate positive effects that are harder to capture through contracting. One might argue that this was the case in eBay, though so long as Bidder's Edge was free to charge for information on its website it is fair to question the degree to which its benefits could not be internalized. Still, to the extent distribution of information generates positive externalities that could not be captured through contracting, the policy argument for preempting the trespass tort in some "pull" cases may have greater appeal than in "push" cases.
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C. Why Normative Analysis Is Needed
As the discussion in Part II.A shows, before CompuServe, the trespass to chattels doctrine had not been extended to create a right of action for harmless intermeddling. Before CompuServe, however, courts had not had to deal with the prospect of one firm running its business and profiting from another firm's investment, without the consent of that firm, but also without harming the physical manifestation of those costs-the network. When faced with a case in which the use did not at least clog the network for a time, as in ThriftyTel, a court would either have to change the doctrine or allow a change in the results that doctrine produced. The court in CompuServe chose the former result; the court in Hamidi chose the latter.
Common law courts have the power to adapt doctrine to new circumstances. 12 1 The preceding discussion shows that, at worst, judges who have extended the trespass tort to cases in which the use at issue did not harm a computer have done so in a plausible way that vindicates an interest the law already recognizes. That is a useful point, if for no other reason than to be fair to the judges, but it does not show that these 120. See infra Part IV.E (noting that there may be positive effects that parties cannot internalize in data harvesting cases); see also infra Part IV.G (stressing the need to distinguish between instances of data pushing and data pulling). [Vol. 35 courts got it right. The real issue is normative: Should access to websites and networks be governed by consent or some form of mandatory access? By a property rule or a liability rule?
In addressing this normative question, academic criticism of trespass should deal more openly with the Restatement's explicit recognition of an interest in the inviolable possession of chattels. The right to an injunction should align with the underlying legal interest. If the law is right to recognize an interest in the inviolable possession of chattel, then courts should enjoin unwanted use, unless some more specific policy trumps the general right. Otherwise the interest varies with the owner's physical strength or, on the Internet, with the cleverness of the owner's counter-hackers.
Such characteristics are not relevant to the policies justifying the recognition of, or a refusal to recognize, a right to exclude. They therefore should not affect the decision of whether to enjoin unwanted use. If the law is incorrect in recognizing such an interest, then the owner should have no privilege to use force to defend it. Instead, the owner should be enjoined from self-help to give users easier access to the website.
Either way, no social purpose is served by what the court of appeals in Hamidi rightly called a pointless and "wasteful cat-and-mouse game" of self-help and countermeasure. 122 There is no principled basis for the supreme court's decision in Hamidi to sever an owner's interest in inviolable possession, and the corresponding absence of a user's right to use the owner's hardware, both of which the court acknowledged, from a cause of action that would give effect to these principles. Here, as in the law generally, a right without a remedy is hollow. 12 3 The court's rather formal approach is inconsistent with the common law tradition of accommodating legal principles to changing circumstances. 124. EISENBERG, supra note 121, at 5 ("If the courts are to explicate the application, meaning, and implications of the society's existing standards in new situations, they cannot simultaneously be prohibited from formulating rules that have not previously been announced.").
This analysis says only that the cause of action and the legal interests should align. It does not say which way they should align. In the next section I explain why the alignment should vindicate an owner's interest in inviolable possession: why CompuServe is right, and Hamidi is wrong.
III. EXCLUSION AND THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF WEBSITES AND NETWORKS
Rights to exclude or eject others from property may be used to bargain with others to amortize the cost of maintaining a place or a chattel, but that is not all they do. Every space frequented by people is instrumentally related to some end. The right to exclude gives managers the legal power to enforce these instrumental relations by excluding persons whose conduct conflicts with the instrumental relations that define the social function of the space. 1 2 5 The right to exclude therefore plays a vital role in constituting the social function of different spaces.
For example, classrooms are for instruction, not chatter. Students who persist in chattering may be expelled from the classroom because their conduct conflicts with the end to which the social space of the classroom is devoted. They may carry on their chosen activity in a social space devoted to it. They might chatter in a coffee house, but not in the classroom. That is not what it is for. If chattering could not be excluded from a classroom, then, over time, chatter would become one of the things the classroom was for, and the instructional function of the social space of the classroom would suffer. 126 The same points are true of computer hardware and the Internet. A server is no more inherently one thing or another than a marble building with columns is inherently a courthouse or a museum. It may become a newspaper, a website for investing in securities, a website for hosting email, or all of these things at once. As with any other social space, however, what the website becomes will be defined in part by who may 125. This point holds even for spaces devoted to letting people do virtually whatever they want, as with Speakers' Corner. That is simply a particular kind of instrumental relationship. See Speakers' Corner, at http://www.speakerscorner.net/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) (exemplifying the notion of designated spaces by allowing people to do virtually whatever they want, and reinforcing a particular kind of instrumental relationship).
126. By "classroom" I do not mean any particular physical location with any particular physical characteristic. Indeed, the same physical space could be a "classroom" at some times and a "playroom" at others. But whatever it is, at the time in question it is that and not something else because some person who controls the space establishes the instrumental relationship and excludes persons whose conduct conflicts with it.
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Website Access: The Case for Consent use it and for what ends, which is to say it will be defined in part by the right to exclude.
Sometimes strict exclusion is necessary for social interaction to occur at all. Internet securities offerings illustrate this point. Several years ago, some firms wanted to make available on the Internet sales presentations (called "roadshows") for registered public offerings. 127 They worried that, if the presentations were "broadcast" generally, they might violate section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.128 Other firms were interested in transactions exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 129 If the issuer or its agents engage in "general solicitation," the transactions will lose their exemption. 130 Both types of firms dealt with these risks by limiting investor access through investor verification and password protection measures.
131
If websites like these had to be open to the public, that fact alone would defeat their purpose. Connecting to the Internet still lowers transaction costs for issuers and investors. However, connecting to the Internet lowers the cost of capital and makes financial markets more efficient. 13 2 Websites like these are no less socially useful because they are exclusive; they are socially useful precisely because they are exclusive.
Even websites that do not face such legal constraints may wish to exclude some users. A firm sponsoring a chat room may wish to bar offensive expression or images from the chat room. An auction website may choose not to host auctions for artifacts of the Nazi regime or slavery. Such choices define the practices that constitute the social function and significance of the website. When users know they are going to a chat room that bars racist speech, 133 that fact is an important element of what it is that the users are doing by going there rather than a chat room devoted to racist speech. 134 America Online ("AOL") posts an extensive set of "web chat rules and etiquette," covering topics like offensive expression, threats, and topicality, to enforce precisely this point. 135 As in physical space, the right to exclude gives effect to such choices.
If society chooses not to recognize such a right, then website owners will be less able to define such communities. When all spaces are fair game for everything in general, no spaces are for anything in particular.
That might look like diversity at first glance, but it is not any more than would be the case if every space on a campus functioned as a quad. 137. I concede that website owners might still attempt to devote sites to particular purposes, but there will always be a risk of encountering something inconsistent with what the site is for, as in the case of pornography in the eBay chatroom. That risk alone would affect the way users orient themselves toward the site. It would be as if one chose to go to a tearoom but worried that a barroom discussion would erupt in the middle of tea. If one wanted bar talk, one would have gone to the bar. Some diversity might survive, but the risk introduced by the open access regime would, like any other form of risk, lessen the value of sites that tried to preserve it.
138. Members of the commons could agree among themselves to respect such rights, but that process would be relatively costly, if it worked at all.
[ These same points apply to the internal operations of firms as well as websites. The legal question is how to treat a firm's choice to connect its internal communications network to the Internet. Hamidi presented this problem. Intel depicted Hamidi as a disgruntled employee willing to lie to advance his interests. 140 Hamidi's e-mails made arguably incendiary factual assertions to current employees, such as "If you are on redeployment, it is highly likely that you are targeted for termination and there will not be any jobs available for you."' 14 1 The California Supreme Court said many employees asked Intel to block further messages, and that the messages "prompted discussions between 'excited and nervous managers' and the company's human resources
What should a court do with such a case? One might say the answer depends on whether the workplace should be a public forum for former employees to vent their anger. Venting might disclose malfeasance, or it might needlessly frighten people who in actuality have nothing to worry about. However, this is a case in which the person who gets to decide the question is more important than the decision in any particular case. Whether a judge should decide depends on whether and to what extent a manager's discretion over workplace communications policies should be subject to judicial review.
E-mail is a means of communication, and policies and practices pertaining to e-mail 103, 112 (1994) ("If you start from property rights, you can negotiate for free distribution; if you start from an absence of property rights, it is very hard to get to the best solution when a charge is optimal."); Hardy, Property, supra note 8, at 222 (explaining that the availability of a means for limiting copying is not a "two way street"; specifically, it allows those who wish to restrict copying to do so and it allows those who do not want to restrict copying not to do so, but the "converse is not true").
140 constitute part of the communicative environment of the workplace. Just as an employer who permits centerfolds to be tacked up on cubicle walls creates a different environment from one who bans them, an employer who limits employee e-mail use will create one sort of environment, and an employer who does not will create another. For this reason, the ability to control e-mail practices is an important aspect of the employer's managerial authority over the workplace. If a court defers to a manager's policies concerning the use of a firm's network, the court leaves it to the firm to decide what expressive environment is best suited to its particular workplace. That is the ordinary legal approach to managerial decisions about the use of firm resources, as evidenced by such deferential doctrines as the business judgment rule. 143 As that rule implies, the law generally counts on labor, product, and financial market competition to constrain managerial discretion in such matters.
If the court limited Intel's discretion, that limitation alone would affect the expressive environment at Intel. Judicial oversight of managerial discretion alters in subtle but fundamental ways the social relationships built on that discretion.
For example, suppose employment termination decisions are treated as state actions, so that an associate who objected to being made to write a brief a certain way could bring a free speech claim if she were fired for her refusal. She could then argue to a judge that she was right to insist on writing the brief her way. Even if matters never reached that end game, adding judicial review as a check on the partner's power to dictate the content of briefs would turn every brief writing assignment into a potential bargaining game. Work would suffer, while no First Amendment values would be served. 144 Managerial discretion over the expressive environment of the workplace is sometimes truncated to advance particular values. The ethics rules prevent the associate from lying in the brief and give her leverage to resist if the partner demands that she lie. 145 The hostile workplace environment cause of action provides a closer analogy to the general problem presented in Hamidi. An employer who would like to encourage pin-ups and cat-calls at work will find himself in a [
At least prior to Hamidi, the same was not true of a firm's policies regarding communication equipment. Employers had discretion over whether employees could use the Internet, whether to block access to certain websites, or whether to block e-mails from certain persons, such as Hamidi. Even after Hamidi, employers presumably retain the power to regulate their employees' use of a network. 14 7 As we have seen, the Hamidi opinion tries to duck the normative questions in the case, producing the odd result that employers have the right to do these things but that, at least with regard to blocking incoming e-mail, the law will not help vindicate that right.
Not every court will be so enamored of formalism, however, so the question of whether courts should pass judgment on a firm's communication policies remains. Subjecting general communication policies to judicial review would diminish employers' ability to tailor the expressive environment to the particular job at hand. That would be unfortunate, because different environments work better in different contexts, and employers have better information about their workplaces than do busy generalists like judges. Unlike judges, employers both bear the costs of erroneous decisions and negotiate with employees who, if they favor Hamidi-like spam, may demand that the employer allow it.
Judicial incursion on managerial authority might be warranted if there were significant free speech interests at stake, as Hamidi argued, 14 8 but there are not. Doctrinally that argument is awkward. The First Amendment gives speakers no right to subsidies or to use the property of others. 149 employees. 15° Even if it did, those rights could be waived as a condition of employment. 15 1 With such paltry free speech rights within the employment relationship (none if the state action requirement is taken seriously), it is hard to justify a right for non-employees to speak within that relationship.
More fundamentally, there are good reasons why free speech rights do not limit managerial discretion within the employment relationship. Content regulation is both necessary and unobjectionable when the purpose and social function of expression is to achieve something other than the type of deliberation and debate the First Amendment tries to foster.
152
Different expressive environments are constituted differently. Regulations affect them in different ways. Not all workplaces are or should be public forums. 15 3 Courts should not presume to the contrary as a premise for extending into workplaces the free speech jurisprudence of the street corner.
To the extent that any aspect of free speech theory is relevant to cases such as Hamidi, it is that the First Amendment cares about the social meaning of speech, which is the product of both the expressive conduct at issue and the social contexts in which it occurs. 154 As noted at the beginning of this Part, the right to exclude plays an important role in constituting different expressive contexts. Thus, if anything, free speech values weigh in favor of giving private parties discretion to form different contexts that support a wide variety of expression. As we have seen, that means such values weigh in favor of granting site owners the right to exclude rather than in favor of a mandatory access rule. [Vol. 35
IV. THE CASE FOR CONSENT
The previous sections demonstrate that access cases present a fundamental normative choice between property and liability rules. This Part argues that website access is better governed by a property rule than a liability rule. To justify this position, this Part examines the case for open access.
A. Mandatory Open Access
One normative argument is that website owners should not be able to bar users from websites, or portions of websites, because the website owner chose to connect to the Internet. The fundamental premise of this argument is that the Internet is a social domain constituted by a norm of open access to the networks connected to it and to content or persons on those networks. It is a commons. 155 To connect to the network is to assent to that norm and place one's website in the commons. 15 6 A related idea is that it is unfair for websites to free ride on the network while withholding their content or bandwidth from network users.
7
For many thoughtful scholars who care deeply about the Internet, this premise is an irreducible truth. It is a statement of what the Internet is, and therefore how the law must treat it. 15 8 For now, I will merely point out that there is nothing inherent in the Internet that makes this premise true, just as there is nothing inherent in real property or chattels that entitles an owner to an injunction. Whether the Internet will be governed by open access is a choice.
The first thing to notice about the open access argument is that the consent idea is just rhetoric. As applied to owners who agree to open access, it is unnecessary. As applied to owners who disagree with open access, it is a fiction. Whether it is a good fiction depends on how it is used. Shedding the consent rhetoric allows us to focus on the premise that the Internet is a commons. If that premise is accepted, the argument is sound, and the cases we have examined are wrong.
155. See, e.g., Ken Hamidi, Ken Hamidi's Message, at http://www.faceintel.com/ hamidismessage.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (describing the Internet as a public domain and a commons, and suggesting that persons working for firms connected to the Internet were, to that extent, "Netizens" rather than mere employees).
156. We saw a version of this argument rejected in CompuServe. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text (explaining the CompuServe case).
157. See Burk, supra note 2, at 51 ("[P]ropertization in a networked environment encourages the holder of the exclusive right to attempt to free ride upon the external benefits of the network, while at-will avoiding contribution of such benefits to others.").
158. E.g., Burk, supra note 2, at 47-48 (arguing that public benefits of the Internet are diminished by propertization); Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 171 ("[Tlhe high hopes raised by cyberspace for changing the information landscape require open access.").
The open access premise is flawed, however. It is too broad to accommodate exclusions that obviously enhance welfare, and it provides no basis for distinguishing among materially different cases. It produces only a binary choice with extreme variance between the two options: either you do not connect to the Internet at all, or everyone with a connection may do what they want on your website.
For example, nothing in this argument justifies a rule allowing owners to prevent access to their websites with passwords. Such websites would free ride on the network as much as any other. 159 Indeed, nothing in this argument allows e-commerce sites to encrypt personal financial information from customers. These implications are disturbing, to say the least. The problem is that the commons argument leans so heavily toward the interests of the community, it leaves no room for those owners to decide for themselves how to structure access to their website. The result is a conventional example of strong communitarianism trumping private interests. 160 Having done away with password protection and privacy, we have only physical harm to the network to consider. I will argue that a website owner should not have to show harm to exclude others. Because the prevailing academic critique of the trespass to chattels doctrine has focused on physical harm, however, I consider here how the commons view deals with harm.
Nothing in the open access argument provides a reason why a user who causes harm to the computers that run a website should have to pay for it. To the contrary, the argument supports, if it does not entail, a privilege to use websites regardless of harm. If the computers become part of a common by connecting to a common, by what logic does a single private party have a right of action if the computers are harmed in the common? Does physical harm to computers count just because the Restatement says it counts? Is there no normative principle at issue? I know of no one who actually defends this view, though neither do critics of the trespass tort make any effort to distinguish on normative grounds physical harm to computers from economic harm to a firm. To the contrary, they criticize courts for taking economic harm into account 159. See Burk, supra note 2, at 47-51 (pointing out disparity when a site requires a password but itself free rides on the network).
160. [Vol. 35 where physical harm is lacking.
16 1 Nevertheless, to take the argument in its strongest form it is best to modify the premise of the open access argument to take harm into account. The revised argument would rest on the premise that the Internet is a social domain constituted by a norm of open access to users and uses that do no harm to content and networks connected to it. It is a commons subject to a harm principle. To apply the argument to concrete cases, we now must define harm in a way that explains why persons who cause it should bear its cost.
Defining harm is hard. The open access argument offers no way to define it, and there is no neutral, objective baseline from which to measure it. Instead, what counts as "harm" depends on baseline entitlements of owners and users, which cannot be taken for granted in defining harm. If one accepts the proposition that firms are entitled to own their productive resources outright, free from unwanted use, then the free riding of Cyber Promotions and Bidder's Edge count as harm. One may reject that proposition, of course, but unless the only logic at hand is the process of elimination, to reject one rule is not to supply an argument in favor of another.
The open access argument provides no basis for distinguishing between economic harm involving server crashes, which trespass to chattel critics seem to regard as harm, and economic harm such as that at issue in CompuServe or even the opportunity cost (under a property rule) present in eBay. Normatively, the distinction makes no sense. The risk of crashing relates inversely to site or network capacity. Capacity is costly. Firms that spend money to build excess capacity, and whose computers thus face only a low risk of crashing, will have less control over their investment than firms with barely enough capacity to get by; those firms could argue that unwanted use took up a relatively high percentage of their available resources. In other words, the notion that only crashing is harm gives weaker rights to firms that have high costs than to those that have low costs, even though the highcost firms have a greater need to cover their costs, which the right to exclude might help them do. financial information. That is true, but the question is: Why not? If the argument discussed in this section is sound, then it compels these conclusions. That serious people shy away from these conclusions suggests the argument is unsound. This fallback position suffers from three flaws. The first is that it cannot be justified by consent because its view of consent is a fiction. It is true that password-protected websites have chosen to be "closed" and eBay has chosen to be "open." It is also true that eBay has chosen to be open subject to certain terms. Reasons must be given to disregard that choice while respecting the choice of password-protected websites to remain "closed."
B. Why the "Take the
Such reasons cannot be derived from utilitarian analysis, which values bargaining because actual consent serves as a proxy for the parties' view of the net welfare effects of transactions among them. 164 It is inconsistent with utilitarian methodology to substitute a fiction for the parties' expressed preferences. 164. This is also true of a related argument, which holds that in responding to queries, hardware "consents" to the request and "gives" away the requested page. See Burk, supra note 2, at 42; O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 590. The Hamidi court made a particularly notable mistake on this point when it said the "undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage to Intel's computer hardware or software and no interference with its ordinary and intended operation." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis added). This argument makes an error that disables utilitarian analysis. The automatic response of a piece of hardware does not reflect anyone's perceptions of welfare in a particular case. It therefore cannot measure welfare for purposes of utilitarian analysis of that case. In this regard, it is telling that the Hamidi court made no effort to specify whose intentions it had in mind, nor why they counted. It could not have meant Intel's intentions in the case at hand, because Intel wanted Hamidi to stop sending messages to its network. It might have meant to refer to Intel's intentions in general, but the court gave no reason why general intentions should trump Intel's intentions in particular cases. Worse yet, the court might have meant to invoke the intentions of the firms that built the hardware to support the idea that, in transmitting Hamidi's e-mails, the computers just processed data, which is what they were built to do. That approach drives welfare analysis even farther away from the case at hand, to the point where the identity and conduct of both parties is essentially irrelevant.
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The second flaw is that to concede that owners may password-protect websites is to concede that, at some level, the law should grant website owners a right to exclude. Password protection is not the private creation of a right; no protected website has bargained with all potential users and obtained their agreement to keep closed. 165 The only remaining question is whether the law should require password protection as a condition of recognizing the right to exclude, or whether it should recognize that right when "open" websites object to particular uses. 166 We cannot measure precisely the welfare effects of these options. 167 We can say, however, that website owners have little or no incentive to exclude uses that produce net benefits. 168 That is why, even after cases like eBay, sites complain about not getting noticed rather than about being browsed. 169 It is why they pay search engines to promote them. 170 It is why, even though all but one court to face this issue between 1997 and 2003 extended the trespass tort to allow owners to regulate access to websites, 17 1 and even though the major search engines can and do skip websites that ask to be skipped, 172 predictions that giving websites a right to exclude would undermine the benefits of 165 . In addition to which, if website owners do not have a right to exclude persons from their websites, then they have no consideration to give in return for subscribers' payment. A person who accesses a protected website without consent or payment has no contract. If they are to be excluded-which they must be for bargaining to work generally-the law must recognize in the website owner a right to exclude.
166. This implication is consistent with my earlier point that the state should enforce interests it deems worthy of recognition when parties cannot enforce those interests themselves. Otherwise, one's rights depend on such ethically trivial characteristics as physical strength or hacking ability.
167. Regarding the measurement problem, see infra Part IV.C (describing how actual measurements of the marginal utility effects of different legal rules are exceptionally difficult).
168. See infra Part IV.C (detailing the measurement problem specifically). 169. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 190 (worrying that trespass rights would "allow every site owner to control the way its site is referred to and indexed" while acknowledging that "[miost sites, however, are unlikely to exercise such a right since they are highly dependent on search engines for reference").
I find the latter statement persuasive and believe it ameliorates substantially the worry of the former. electronic commerce have not been borne out. 17 3 None of the scholars who warned of dire harm from extension to the trespass tort, and whose work the Hamidi court cited, 17 4 pointed to any harm that such rulings had caused in the several years in which courts had extended the tort.
Because real-world experience tends to falsify such conjectures, the harms they predict should be discounted at a high rate. 175 The net expected cost of recognizing a right to exclude for "open" websites is therefore probably very low. 176 The only benefit from a rule requiring websites to "close" as a condition of recognizing a right to exclude is that the rule would avoid this expected cost. That means the gain (cost 173. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., supra note 94, at 3-6 (stating the reasoning employed in that case "may have disastrous implications for basic types of behavior fundamental to the Internet"). In deciding not to extend the trespass tort, the Hamidi court cited predictions of harm in an amicus brief filed by many of the same intellectual property professors who submitted a similar brief two years earlier in eBay. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 310-11 (Cal. 2003). These predictions seemed to be based on the premise that the lower court ruling in Hamidi would require all users to obtain advance consent before any use of a site. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., supra note 94, at 12-13. The lower court in Hamidi did not say that, however. Instead, it rejected the assertion that extending the trespass tort implied that "every personal e-mail that an employee reads at work could constitute a trespass." It held that "where the employer has told the sender the entry is unwanted and the sender persists, the employer's petition for redress is proper. Va. 1998) (noting steps defendant took to elude AOL filtering software). Finally, as Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissent in the supreme court's Hamidi decision, the formalism of the trespass critique would allow a cause of action if a computer were harmed even though a user would have no way of knowing in advance whether the marginal effect of his or her use would be too much for the computer. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 331 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Thus, the claim the amicus brief conceded could be made presented the very risk of liability without notice that this argument decries.
174. Hamidi, 371 P.3d at 310-11. 175. Indeed, if critics of the trespass to chattels doctrine are willing to tolerate passwordprotected sites, they must explain why society should accept the risk that all sites will choose that option, producing the harms they predict from cases such as eBay. I suspect the answer is that everyone knows most websites will not choose that option. Owners go on the Internet to get noticed; commercial websites make their living that way. They have no incentive to make it harder for people to find them. The incentive to make access easy does not change if we allow exclusion without password protection.
176. I say net costs because while excluding uses will always be a cost to the excluded user, exclusion might produce a net social gain by avoiding the costs of the use.
avoided) from such a rule would be low. The cost of such a rule would be the sum of very small transaction costs spread over perhaps millions of users. Each user would incur a small cost, in other words, to keep out a free rider like Bidder's Edge. It is hard to estimate that sum, but it is probably high relative to the small benefit of the rule. Utilitarian analysis would reject the rule as wasteful.
177
Third and finally, "take the bitter with the sweet" statements are not arguments. There is no logical difference between "If you want to exclude people, then password protect" and "If you want tenure, vote Republican." That is because neither statement has any analytical content at all. Unless additional propositions explain why one must take the bitter to get the sweet, and why imposition of the bitter is normatively acceptable, such statements have no analytical value. Without more, such statements are simply positions that, when adopted, reflect only the power to adopt them.
Here, the power comes from the cost that sites would incur if the law forces owners to make access for all users more costly in order to stop a particular user like Hamidi or Bidder's Edge. If one assumes that use relates inversely to the cost of use, such as remembering and entering passwords, then the prospect of avoiding that cost would serve as leverage in favor of open access if we adopted the "bitter with the sweet" position as law. Requiring sites to password protect when they would prefer to be open to most uses would limit the ability of site owners to tailor access to the costs and benefits of particular uses. That might benefit users, but it presumably makes site owners worse off, so it would generate no predictions about net welfare without more precise calculation. By limiting the parties' ability to align their estimates of the welfare effects of their interactions, the relatively crude "bitter with the sweet" rule would therefore probably produce lower net welfare than a rule that left the parties freer to bargain over different uses.
C. A Simple Utilitarian Position and Problems of Measurement
Rather than arguing for mandatory access as such, one might advance a simple utilitarian position: The rule governing access should be the rule that produces the greatest net welfare in society. If courts employ a hedonic utilitarian approach, 17 8 they would not have to define harm;
177. See O'Rourke, Analogy, supra note 12, at 616 (noting (without necessarily endorsing) the argument that "[riequiring a site to build a fence to keep out unwanted visitors is simply a waste of resources"). rather, harm is whatever people experience as harm, and gains are whatever they experience as gains.
Stated so abstractly, the utilitarian goal will not decide actual cases. On the Internet, there are millions of different situations involving millions of types of utility and disutility going on every minute. No one has the data necessary to sum gains and losses from different rules, certainly not busy generalists like judges. 179 One can think of particular cases in which losses from an open access regime would exceed gains, of course. If the open access rule extended to personal financial information stored on e-commerce websites, the losses to society would exceed the gains. There would be a quick burst of rampant theft, followed by an enormous round of transaction costs to cancel and reissue credit cards, followed by the collapse of such websites.
The problem lies in aligning that example with a normative principle that justifies it. If we decide it would be ridiculous to extend the open access norm to websites that pitch exempt offerings or to encrypted financial data, then we know we should reject premises that compel such results. We do not know from this analysis what premises to put in their place. When it is used to justify the result, rather than as a step in an argument, the statement, "Of course it's OK to encrypt and password protect personal financial data, you fool," is the analytical equivalent of "because."
Setting aside external ethical critiques, the problem of utilitarianism is the problem of measurement. It is easy to employ the rational actor assumption to support consequentialist conjectures. One might say that granting website owners the right to exclude will produce an anticommons nightmare, or that granting users a right of access will increase both allocative and dynamic efficiency. Theories are not measurements, however, and they therefore do little to satisfy the utilitarian requirement that costs and benefits be summed. Actual measurements of the marginal utility effects of different legal rules are exceptionally difficult. Problems in the real world must be solved using presumptions and heuristics that relate human behavior to expected welfare effects. [Vol. 35
D. The Case for Consent
The case for consent rests on the presumption that bargaining over resources produces results that more closely approximate the optimal utilitarian regime than any other method of decision, such as litigation. The underlying behavioral assumption is that persons act rationally; the logical extension of that assumption as regards net welfare is the Coase theorem. 180 The legal extension is that courts should favor property rules where transaction costs are low and liability rules where they are high.
1
Briefly, the argument is as follows: actions have both costs and benefits, and rigorous analysis must consider both. The rational actor assumption implies that if parties reach a voluntary and informed bargain, then both parties are better off than they would have been without the bargain.
On this account, if certain conditions are satisfied, such as that the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed and occurs in a reasonably competitive market, bargains provide a crude measure of the sum of utility (though not the distribution of gains) in the transaction. 182 They therefore satisfy the utilitarian criterion better than top-down consequentialist theorizing, which generates predictions rather than even the very crude measurements derived from bargains. Conversely, if persons in such circumstances can bargain but do not reach an agreement, we may infer that the joint gains from trade were not enough to leave each side better off. 183 That idea suggests courts might reduce net welfare if they either compel dealing between parties who are able to bargain but have not reached an agreement or allow one party to take and use a resource, for which use the court will later try to fix a price.
184
These propositions support the general conclusion that bargains produce higher expected net utility than compulsory dealing.
Institutional considerations support this point as well. Contracting places decisions in the hands of persons actually affected by bargains, who have relatively good information and who bear the costs and reap the benefits of the decisions. It aligns benefits and the costs necessary to create them and internalizes at least some effects of different behaviors. It avoids the uncertainty and cost of ex post facto damages determinations by persons such as judges, who have less reliable information than contracting parties and who do not bear the costs or enjoy the gains of their decisions.
185
E. Why Traditional Arguments Against Bargaining Do Not Undermine the Case for Consent
As an alternative to bargaining, one might favor a damages rule, which would allow persons to use property without permission and settle up through damages after the fact if they have caused enough damage to make settling up worth the effort. 186 Such considerations may persuade courts to modify even conventional trespass to land doctrine into a quasi-nuisance regime, requiring a plaintiff to show damages as a condition to obtaining relief. 187 The case for damages leans heavily on defects that might render bargaining an unreliable proxy for the welfare effects of certain actions.
A familiar argument against a property rule and in favor of a liability rule is that transaction costs might preclude bargaining. 188 If bargaining is too expensive, it makes no sense to rely on it to allocate resources. Some scholars worry that recognizing property interests will lead to a tragedy of the anti-commons, where there are so many conflicting . 1985) (worrying that giving all downwind homeowners a potential property rule as against a polluter would lead to costly strategic negotiation, and therefore limiting potential recovery in tort to plaintiffs who had suffered "actual and substantial damages"). The court in essence converted the property rule of trespass into a liability rule because of the quite reasonable fear that transaction costs would prevent the property rule from achieving an efficient result. property interests that transacting becomes too costly and breaks down, with the result that nothing gets done.
189
There is no reason to believe transaction costs justify a damages rule in the types of cases we have examined. None of those cases presents a problem of prohibitive transaction costs. 190 In each of the cases save Thrifty-Tel, bargaining was possible. In eBay, bargaining occurred. It broke down not because transaction costs were too high, but because the parties disagreed on the substantive terms. That is not market failure.
There is no reason to expect transaction costs to be prohibitively high in such cases in the future. 19 1 As to human interactions, search costs will be lower, and there will be no need to hunt for parking or wait in line. 192 As to automated searches, "robots" may be instructed to obey standardized instructions posted on websites, which give website owners a way to limit automated browsing while allowing robots to index hundreds of millions of webpages at a trivial cost. 19 3 The leading search engines, Google, Yahoo!, and Alta Vista, respect such instructions. 194 Internet technologists developed this protocol on their own because they recognized its utility for themselves; it is not a lawyers' scheme. 192. Verification costs on non-fungible goods, such as with clothing sizes, might be higher, however. 195. See Koster, supra note 193 (explaining that the standards were arrived at by a consensus of those with an interest in robots). That search engines actually adhere to the robot exclusion protocol calls into question the assertion that there is a norm of open access. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 163, at 170 (explaining that the World Wide Web was created to provide open access to all users). One could as well say there is a norm that users will respect instructions to skip a site, in For these reasons, generalized statements asserting that transaction costs on the Internet are "high," or that recognizing a right to exclude at the website level would create an anti-commons problem, should be viewed skeptically. Actual practice contradicts them. 19 6 Scholars, judges, and legislators should view with particular skepticism the idea that search engines would suffer if the law required them to do what at least the leader is doing already.
See
This point also applies to a particular type of transaction cost-the holdout problem. The version of that problem relevant here occurs when a project requires the cooperation of all concerned in order to proceed. 19 7 The worry is that bargaining will break down because each person will want to be the last to sign up in order to have the most leverage to obtain a disproportionate share of the gains from the project as a whole. 198 None of the trespass to chattel cases presents such a problem because none of the cases requires unanimous or even general cooperation regarding access to particular websites.
That is why access cases differ from particulates trespass cases, in which the doctrines of trespass to land and nuisance have largely merged. 19 9 Particulates cases involve a defendant "pushing" particulates over a wide area with many potential plaintiffs. If each plaintiff had a property right to stop any incursion, the defendant would have to bargain with all potential parties to begin any operations. The numbers of potential parties might be high. Because the consent of all parties would be necessary, holdout problems would be severe. These facts present a classic case for a liability rule because transaction costs prevent bargaining. 20 0 which case the norms support owners such as eBay rather than norm-violating users such as Bidder's Edge.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184 (arguing that bargaining more closely attains an optimal utilitarian regime).
197. See Burk, supra note 2, at 49 (mentioning the holdout problem as a potential risk). A different version of the problem involves bilateral monopoly, which is not present in any case we have considered. But see eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (coming closest to the problem but where bargaining had occurred).
198. EPSTEIN, supra note 123, at 133 (applying the laws of trespass to a detailed illustration of "cattle trespass").
199. See supra note 113 (describing the convergence of trespass to land and nuisance doctrines).
200. Demsetz, supra note 185, at 357. I say classic case because courts and academics tend to favor a liability rule in this situation. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 185, at 450-5 1. By saying this is the "classic" case, I do not mean to say it is a "conclusive" case. See id. at 454-55 (noting that the preference for liability rules where transaction costs are high "[m]akes no sense" because the same facts that impair bargaining impair damage valuations).
In contrast, on the Internet, users make discrete choices to visit particular websites. Websites deal bilaterally with individual users all the time. Website interactions do not require unanimous or even widespread consent; that is why eBay could reach agreements with other search engines while refusing to consent to Bidder's Edge's demands. 20 1 When users come to websites one at a time, the holdout problem does not preclude bargaining. This point applies to search engines as well. Leading search engines read robot.txt files and skip websites that do not want to be searched. 20 2 This practice does not prevent them from searching websites that welcome the publicity. The prediction that individual exclusion of websites will create a search engine anti-commons is at odds with current practice.
Internet interactions present a different transaction cost structure than smokestack pollution or broadcasting or the distribution of electricity, 20 3 and the difference in transaction costs justifies different rules.
A different objection is that if transaction costs are so low, then the difference between property and liability rules does not matter.
4
Critics of the trespass doctrine have not raised this argument, but there is something to it. In the extreme case of zero transaction costs, the Coase Theorem suggests the choice of rule does not matter. 20 5 I have said only that costs are low, however, not that they are zero. Holdout problems would be severe if all concerned tried to create property rights through collective bargaining, so it is better to assign them to the owner in the first instance. 20 6 In addition, even very low transaction costs do not imply that litigation approximates the social optimum as well as bargaining. Judges get their information from parties, so in virtually all cases they cannot have better information about a party's situation than the party itself. A judge might synthesize information to get a clearer picture of the whole situation than either party has, but that is very unlikely. Neither party has an incentive to tell the unvarnished truth. Instead, parties spin their stories through lawyers, who might not understand the facts very well to begin with, and who are in any event trying to win. It follows that, most of the time, judges will have much worse information than either party or both parties put together. 20 7 For these reasons, to the extent judges interject themselves into the substance of bargaining, they will tend to lessen the degree to which bargaining reflects the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of uses. That is a cost that counts in utilitarian analysis. While judges can do some good, these considerations justify skepticism regarding judicial intervention.
A different objection puts judges in a slightly better light. It is that bargaining will not achieve optimal results because it will not account for the value of positive (network) externalities. 20 8 At the network level, the social value of the Internet increases with the number of persons who use it and post content on it. 20 9 Network-wide coordination is necessary on some issues, such as communication protocols. 2 10 Access to particular content on particular websites is not one of those issues, however.
11
In some data harvesting cases, there probably are positive effects the parties cannot internalize. The nature and magnitude of those effects depend on how the data are used. The cases to date do not show that the externality concern justifies a damages rule, however. As noted earlier, owners, especially retailers and auctioneers, go on the Internet in the first place to take advantage of the lower search and transaction costs it offers. That is why they pay search engines to sponsor links or "bias" results. 2 counsel, rarely any others.... The judges and jurors almost never make any inquiries on their own, and are not staffed or otherwise equipped to do so. The reconstructions of the past to be given in the courtroom are likely to be the sharply divergent stories told by partisans, divergent from each other and from the actual events supposed to be portrayed. Id. at 405 (quoting Frankel).
208. The reason is that, where parties to bargaining cannot capture all the value created by the bargain, they will have too little incentive to bargain. Thus, net utility might be higher under a regime of compulsory access than under a regime of bargaining.
209. Burk, supra note 2, at 48 (arguing against over-propertization of the Internet produces net gains. 213 The expected cost of a property rule is therefore low.
Professor O'Rourke argues that websites might refuse to be browsed to preserve market power or for other socially undesirable reasons.
14
At first glance it seems odd that a website would try to preserve market power by decreasing traffic to the site, thus lowering the number of transactions in which it could engage. Professor O'Rourke suggests, however, that brand loyalty or other factors might cause consumers to forgo comparison shopping, even though comparison shopping on the Internet is relatively cheap even in the presence of some market power. If that is the case, a site might have an interest in keeping its prices off aggregator websites, on which consumers could more readily compare prices across firms.
15
As with the transaction cost argument, there is in theory a case in which this objection could be true. Market power implies that a firm could charge prices above the competitive level. If it were doing so, that might give it a reason to avoid dispersion of its prices, so long as the gains from sales at prices above the competitive level exceeded losses from sales not made because consumers did not find the website. I do not know how often that will be the case, if ever. Of the cases to date, only eBay involves a site with a plausible claim to market power, and there was no evidence that eBay tried to leverage that power in welfare-reducing ways. 2 17 eBay did not object to realtime queries by Bidder's Edge, only to that firm's practice of maintaining its own database of eBay auctions, which would tend to lag pay a fee for priority positioning"), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-mds/isem.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
213. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 2, at 169-170 ("If you are not listed in the search results you are almost nonexistent on the web."); O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 2004 ("Because a site generally has an incentive to attract the maximum number of customers, its policy toward indexing must reflect that which is efficient both for it and its customers." [Vol. 35 actual bidding on eBay. 2 18 eBay apparently worried that old bid data would mislead consumers by understating the interest the market showed in items listed on eBay. 2 19 If one accepts the premise that "bidding begets bids," 220 this concern was rational. Gains to Bidder's Edge might have been losses both to consumers, who missed auctions they would have visited if their information had been current, 22 1 and to eBay sellers, whose sale prices would be lower than if buyers had current information. (Unlike Bidder's Edge, which reported on auctions others hosted but which did not host auctions itself, eBay had to worry about the welfare of sellers as well as buyers.) Because eBay charges a fraction of the sales price, it would bear costs, too.
222
F. Why Consent Should Prevail as the Default Rule
Because the actual cases provide no support for these theoretical objections to bargaining, the objections do not undermine the case for consent. There have been many predictions that applying trespass theory to websites would produce great harm. Some of these theories, such as the holdout concern, have no logical basis. Those that do have a logical basis face a factual problem: trespass theory has been applied in 218 . Professor Elkin-Koren suggests eBay might have resisted browsing to maintain "its control over the community of users that occupies its site since ... [ Many sellers believe that reserves reduce the number of bidders and hurt your final fee.
Other sellers believe the opposite-by starting an auction with a low price and a reasonable reserve, you will attract early bidding and bidders will gravitate to your auction (i.e. bids beget bids). You'll have to experiment a bit to see what works for you.
Id.
221. It would be very hard for consumers to discount accurately the information they found on Bidder's Edge. The difference between the results in Bidder's Edge's database and actual bidding would depend on how often Bidder's Edge queried eBay and how much bidding occurred in between those queries. Bidder's Edge might have disclosed the first variable, though there is no evidence that it did; it could not have disclosed the second.
222. See O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 12, at 1983-84 (discussing relationship between profit sites and indexes). Professor O'Rourke questions the staleness argument, noting that firms now live with information that might become stale, as with advertised prices in monthly magazines. Id. at 1979 n.59. That would not be true of auctions, in which prices are set in real time, however, and which constitute a bidding process rather than an invitation to bid. Though we have lived with stale information in the past, it would be desirable to have fresher information in the future. several cases spanning several years, and the harm has not occurred. 223 Utilitarianism requires that predictions be discounted to reflect their probabilities; the expected cost of these predicted harms is very low.
Even if the expected cost were higher, however, such predictions make no affirmative case for some rule other than access. All markets fall short of conditions needed for perfect competition. 224 To show that markets for website access do, too, does no more than place them within the set of all markets. Being part of the set of all markets provides no basis for treating markets for access differently from any other markets. Unless there is a general reason to believe that judicial determinations approximate the socially optimal result better than bargaining, then these objections do not make any comparative point at all, much less an affirmative case for some other rule, such as nuisance.
One way or another, it is an affirmative, comparative point that needs to be made. Owners might have sub-optimal incentives, but their information and incentives still might produce results closer to the social optimum than the information and incentives of judges. Factors that reduce confidence in bargaining tend to reduce confidence in judicial valuation as well. 225 Because judges have systematically worse information than parties, which makes their utility calculations less reliable to begin with, even increasing transaction costs may not narrow the gap between bargaining and litigation very much. At a minimum, it is very hard to choose in the abstract. Contextual analysis is necessary, which is one reason I emphasize the facts of the cases rather than hypothetical risks.
Professor O'Rourke rightly says that the real question is "on which side of the coin-strong or weak property rights-should the law err at the beginning stages of a new technology? ' 2 26 Professor O'Rourke believes this is a tough call, but that "because we know so little about the direction in which technology will develop and because incentives are not always aligned optimally to ensure efficient licensing, a cautious 223. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184 (arguing that bargaining more closely attains the optimal utilitarian regime).
224. approach to property rights may be appropriate." 22 7 For both Professor O'Rourke and Professor Burk, these facts make a nuisance rule or other "weak" entitlement, in which judges may balance social costs and benefits, preferable to the strong property rule injunctions imply.
28
These arguments make a persuasive case that judges should worry about their imperfect information and the risk of unintended consequences from their decisions and should proceed cautiously in establishing access rules. 229 A property rule is superior to other rules for precisely those reasons. Adopting a rule of consent is the most prudent decision judges can make because it poses the lowest risk and cost of error, and because it allows the greatest degree of selfdetermination among sites.
On the first point, as demonstrated in Part III, if a site wishes to leave itself open to the public, it is free to do so. A rule of consent does it no harm. If a website wishes to close itself, however, either in whole or in part, then a rule of general access will prevent it from doing so. 2 30 No website would be able to bargain with all potential users for consent allowing it to close. Granting the right is better than either mandatory access or balancing, because it will not be used if it is not needed, and if it is needed it cannot be privately created.
On the second point, if one concedes that some websites in some circumstances should be allowed to limit access, then the only real question is who decides when closure is good. Bargaining is the best bet. The lack of information about welfare effects, which plagues scholars (who may contemplate such things at their leisure), plagues judges too. 23 231. Judge Whyte offered a commendably candid comment on this point in eBay. In discussing the requirement that he consider the public interest in granting injunctive relief, he said "[tihe court. . . recognizes that it is poorly suited to determine what balance between encouraging the exchange of information, and preserving economic incentives to create, will maximize the public good." eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. [Vol. 35 so poorly aligned with social welfare that judges can do better than bargaining.
32
Even if one just cannot help trusting judges more than parties, however, there is a real social cost to empowering judges to re-weigh decisions about workplace expression that are currently within the domain of managerial discretion. 2 33 In the best case, managers whose discretion was limited by the possibility of a judicial re-weighing of access decisions would find it harder to constitute the expressive workplace environment they feel is best suited to their particular job. In the worst case, judges would find they are no better at judging the substantive merit of e-mail messages than they were at defining obscenity and would adopt an "anything goes" posture that would homogenize at the least common denominator that portion of the expressive workplace environment that connected to the Internet.
G. Possible Exceptions to the Consent Default
No legal rule is absolute, and this Article does not advocate an absolute rule to govern website access. Injunctions should be a strong default rule, but departures could be justified by theory and evidence showing that some other rule optimizes social welfare better than bargaining. In particular, because we are working within utilitarianism, if courts can identify a set of cases where a liability rule or use privilege creates greater net welfare than bargaining, then that set of cases should be governed by such a rule. 234 Like the transaction cost arguments, however, this qualification states only a theoretical point. None of the cases analyzed previously justify a preference for judicial resource allocation over bargaining.
In analyzing claims for exceptions, courts should distinguish the "pushing" of data through a network, as in the spam cases, from the "pulling" of data from a website, as in eBay. 2 35 In the former cases, the parties are in a good position to internalize most of the costs and benefits of use. Therefore, courts should view with great skepticism claims that welfare would be enhanced through a compelled right of access to "push" data through a network. Externalities might be a greater problem in "pull" cases, depending on how harvested data are used. No such case to date presents a plausible claim that judges could approximate the optimal result better than bargaining, but if a wellreasoned and well-documented case could be made, it would be a mistake to dismiss it out of reflexive deference to bargaining.
Finally, courts should take seriously the consent default and the notice requirement to qualify or revoke consent. Owners should be required to use the means best suited to particular uses and be clear about the terms they impose.
Plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that use was not consensual, which means they should bear the burden of showing that they notified the defendant that its use was nonconsensual.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts in website and network access cases have expanded the doctrine of trespass to chattels because existing law recognizes an interest in the inviolable possession of chattels that is being violated in cases where self-help fails. By modifying the doctrine, these courts have replicated the results the Restatement expected the law to achieve. The criticism of these decisions, which holds implicitly that the results may change but the doctrine must remain the same, rests on a formalism that has not been adequately defended and which I believe is not defensible.
Granting website and network owners the right to exclude allows them to constitute a wide variety of different social environments. Adopting a rule of mandatory access impairs this ability. The risk and costs of error are greater in the latter case, because a website that has a right to exclude need not use it, while one that needs it but does not have it will not be able to replicate it through bargaining. It is better to have a right and not need it, than to need a right and not have it.
In addition, the owner's discretion plays an important role in constituting and managing these expressive environments. Negating or limiting that discretion, as by judicial review under a nuisance theory, will affect these environments regardless of the results of particular 235 . See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting "pull," versus "push" websites).
[
Simply moving control over such resources from the managerial domain to the more ambiguous domain of judicial review will interfere with the social processes through which environments are constituted.
The argument for open access fails because excluding users from sites enhances welfare in at least some cases. Neither the open access argument nor the more modest "bitter with the sweet" position provides any basis to distinguish socially desirable from undesirable exclusions. The only question in these cases is whether bargaining or judicial review should govern access. The case for bargaining is stronger and should prevail as the default rule.
